The 2016 Presidential elections were eventful, to say the least. Early leaders plummeted in popularity following charges of graft and corruption, surprise candidates enjoyed meteoric rises in the polls, and safe choices fell by the wayside. The voting public was constantly faced with the challenge of deciding whom they deemed most worthy to be the country’s Head of State. One of the most dramatic narratives from this period was that of frontrunner and Presidential-hopeful Senator Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares.

Several parties questioned Poe-Llamanzares’ qualifications under the Constitution’s residency and citizenship requirements for President. As to residency, it was alleged that she had not resided in the Philippines for the requisite period, and hence, was not qualified to run. As to citizenship, however, the controversy stemmed from her birth. Poe-Llamanzares was a foundling — an infant abandoned by her birth parents, but eventually adopted. In a country where the Constitution stipulates that citizenship is to be determined on the basis of bloodline, this meant that her status as a Filipino was uncertain. Her case compelled legal scholars to ask — Could a person whose birth parents were unknown claim to be a Filipino by *jus sanguinis*? And what does being a foundling mean for one’s nationality and citizenship, both in international and domestic law?

In this Article, Sedfrey M. Candelaria and Jewelle Ann Lou Santos look into the split decision of the Court in *Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC*. They analyze and compare the majority decision, which takes on a human rights-based approach to the issue of foundlings and makes use of novel tools of judicial review; and the dissenting Justices’ opinions, which were rooted in classic statutory construction.

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Nationality, Citizenship, and Foundlings as Pronounced in *Poe-Llamanzares v.* Commission on Elections

Sedfrey M. Candelaria
Jewelle Ann Lou P. Santos

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Philippine legal system once again faced with the challenge of interpreting the Philippine law on citizenship — this time, in relation to foundlings. The Supreme Court of the Philippines was given the unprecedented duty of arriving at a judicial test for determining a foundling’s citizenship.

The task that was imposed upon the Supreme Court was not easy, in view of the political underpinnings that prevailed over the issue. Additionally, the Court undertook this standard-setting while having to insulate itself from the various political persuasions and considerations that have been advanced by election polls.
The Authors aim to provide the readers with a broader context of issues in determining nationality or citizenship, for the purpose of properly situating the delicate task of defining the judicial standards, as applied to the status of foundlings in the Philippines.

This Article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the issue at hand through the lens of international law, by detailing the standard practice of States as regards citizenship and nationality. It includes discourse on the various ways by which an individual may acquire and lose his or her nationality, and the consequences of such nationality under international law. It focuses on the concept of multiple nationality and the continuing debate over its acceptance or rejection. The second part of this Article discusses the citizenship of foundlings under domestic law. It delves into the case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections by outlining the facts, issues, and ultimate ruling of the Supreme Court. The discussion of the case is divided into two — the majority’s ruling through a human rights-based approach and the use of novel tools of judicial review, on the one hand, and the dissenting Justices’ opinion through classic statutory construction, on the other. Accordingly, the last part of this Article provides for the gaps and consequences of the Court’s ruling in Poe-Llamanzares and for the possible questions that one could ask in analyzing the interpretation made by the Supreme Court.

The Authors further envision that this survey of State practice, as applied to the present case, would better inform the readers on the novelty of using a relatively new approach to judicial interpretation involving statistical probability, among others.

II. STATE PRACTICE ON CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY

A. Defining Nationality and Citizenship

Nationality and citizenship are often used interchangeably because of the close connection between the two concepts. Dr. Siofra O’Leary said that the two concepts “present legal significance and content[,] are of recent origin[,] and are closely linked to a series of historical and political developments which have varied from place to place.” In fact, writers and scholars are not in agreement in outlining the difference between these concepts.

On the one hand, nationality is the “connection that links individuals to a particular [S]tate ... notwithstanding a particular individual’s ethnic background or origin, or identity.”³ This concept centers on the relationship between the State and the individual which gives rise to rights and duties in relation to that individual on the “plane of the law of nations.”⁴ On the other hand, citizenship implies that “an individual possesses particular rights under a [S]tate’s municipal law.”⁵

Simply put, nationality is the “external manifestation of [S]tate membership,” while citizenship is the “internal reflection of [S]tate membership[,]” granting the citizen political, social, and economic rights.⁶

As far as international law is concerned, nationality is the legal status conferred upon a person by a State under international law, while citizenship is a person’s relationship with the State under municipal law.⁷ Though these two concepts are often converged under municipal law, their distinction under international law holds true until today.⁸

In international law, attribution of both nationality and citizenship is discretionary on the part of the States. Hence, under municipal legislation, States may extend some rights and obligations to its citizens, but not to its nationals, or vice versa.

B. Nationality in International Law

As a general rule, a person’s nationality in international law is the same as his or her nationality under municipal law. Nevertheless, there are instances that

³  Id.
⁴  Id. at 71.
⁵  Id. at 58. Max Weber provided for three distinct meanings for citizenship in social history. These are:
   (1) classes that share a specific communal or economic interest;
   (2) membership determined by rights within the State; or
   (3) strata defined by standard of living or social prestige.
   The second meaning is what is usually confused with nationality. Max Weber, The Concept of Citizenship in MAX WEBER ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 239 (Shmuel N. Eisenstadt ed., 1968) (emphasis supplied).
⁶  BOLL, supra note 2, at 75 (citing O’LEARY, supra note 2, at 10).
⁷  BOLL, supra note 2, at 2.
⁸  Id.
international law “gives the effect of nationality” of a State to a person who is not considered a national under municipal law. Accordingly, nationality under international law, as defined by Dr. Paul Weis, “is the technical term denoting the allocation of individuals, termed nationals, to a specific State — the State of nationality — as members of that State, a relationship which confers upon the State of nationality ... rights and duties in relation to other States.” In an international context, the State’s rights and duties, arising from the status of nationality, in relation to other States, are relevant. These matters are beyond the concern of nationality in the context of municipal law as the latter relates to the relationship between the national and the State of nationality, without regard to other States.

In the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) applied the “test of effective nationality” in the recognition of nationality in international law, especially in cases of multiple nationality. Friedrich Nottebohm was a German national who, in 1905, went to Guatemala and made it the center of his business activities. He sometimes returned to Germany for business or for country holidays. He also visited Liechtenstein, where one of his brothers had lived. In October 1939, a month after the opening of the Second World War by Germany’s attack on Poland, Nottebohm acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein. He did so by taking an oath of allegiance and by paying a substantial amount of fees and annual taxes. Subsequently, using his Liechtenstein passport, he returned to Guatemala and resumed his business activities. In Guatemala, however, his property was seized because Nottebohm was a German national or an “enemy alien” during the Second World War. Nevertheless, Liechtenstein was a neutral State during the War. It instituted a case in the

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9. *Id.* at 95.
10. *Id.* (citing Paul Weis, *Nationality and Statelessness in International Law* 59 (1979)).
11. *Id.*
13. *Id.* at 13.
14. *Id.*
15. *Id.*
16. *Id.* at 15-16.
17. *Id.*
19. *Id.* at 6-7.
20. *Id.* at 26.
ICJ against Guatemala for restitution and compensation due to the illegal confiscation of Nottebohm’s property.\textsuperscript{21}

Using the “test of effective nationality,” the ICJ held that the claim of Liechtenstein was not admissible against Guatemala.\textsuperscript{22} The ICJ gave preference to the “real and effective nationality” based on the real connection between the person and the State whose nationality is involved.\textsuperscript{23} There are different factors to be considered, as the ICJ ruled — “the habitual residence of the individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other factors such as the [center] of his interests, his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”\textsuperscript{24} As there was no real prior connection between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein, Guatemala is not obliged to recognize the nationality granted by Liechtenstein.\textsuperscript{25}

It is worth emphasizing, however, that the “test of effective nationality” is not applied to persons with a single nationality,\textsuperscript{26} but is used in analyzing any form of nationality (i.e., other than through naturalization).\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{Nottebohm Case} also received its fair share of criticism by raising questions as to the equivalence of long-term residence to nationality, or whether Nottebohm should have been treated as a national of Guatemala because of his long-term connection with the State.

Nevertheless, the \textit{Nottebohm Case} is an adequate illustration of the variance between nationality under municipal legislation and under international law. As a State has the right to identify a person as its national, other States have the prerogative \textit{not} to recognize a nationality attributed by naturalization.

\textbf{C. State Practice in Determining Nationality}

Nationality — including the rights and duties emanating from it — is largely within the domain of municipal law.\textsuperscript{28} However, a balance has always been

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{Id.} at 12.
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{Id.} at 26.
\item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{Id.} at 22.
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{Nottebohm Case,} 1955 I.C.J. at 22 (emphases supplied).
\item \textsuperscript{25} \textit{Id.} at 26.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Flegenheimer Claim (Italy v. U.S.), 14 R.I.A.A. 327, 377 (1958).
\item \textsuperscript{27} BOLL, supra note 2, at 113.
\item \textsuperscript{28} BOLL, supra note 2, at 94 (citing WEIS, supra note 10, at 29).
\end{itemize}
present between the concept of nationality under international law and under municipal law.²⁹

The succeeding discussion will provide for the rules of international law and State practice related to nationality.

1. Attribution and Acquisition of Nationality

The general rule is that States have the absolute freedom in determining whom they consider as their nationals.³⁰ Alfred Michael Boll provided for five common modes of acquiring nationality under international law or based on State practice,³¹ to wit:

(1) *Jus soli* or birth in national territory;
(2) *Jus sanguinis* or birth to a parent who is a national of the State;
(3) Naturalization;
(4) Resumption; and
(5) Transfer of territory.³²

a. *Jus Soli* or Birth in National Territory

*Jus soli* provides for a birthright nationality to any person born within the territory of a State. It is said to have been the dominant mode of acquisition of nationality in 18th century Europe.³³ The *jus soli* rule is a State practice in the United States of America (US), among other States.

b. *Jus Sanguinis* or Birth to a Parent who is a National of the State

*Jus sanguinis* provides for the acquisition of nationality by blood relationship.³⁴ The Philippines follows the *jus sanguinis* rule by providing,

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²⁹. Id. at 97.
³¹. Id. at 99.
³². Id.
under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, that “[t]hose whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines”\textsuperscript{35} are Filipino citizens.

c. Naturalization

In a limited sense, naturalization is the conferment of nationality by a State to an alien upon fulfillment of certain legal requirements\textsuperscript{36}. Broadly, however, it is defined as the change of nationality after birth, including acquisition of nationality as a result of State succession, marriage to a foreign national, legitimation or adoption of children, naturalization of a minor as a result of the naturalization of the parents, acquisition of nationality through exercise of an option, obtaining appointment as a civil servant or joining the armed forces, and reintegration as a national\textsuperscript{37}.

d. Resumption

Resumption, also called “reintegration,” presupposes loss of nationality through naturalization in other States or for some other causes\textsuperscript{38}. It is the recovery of a person’s original nationality upon fulfillment of certain conditions and requirements as provided by the State’s municipal law\textsuperscript{39}.

e. Transfer of Territory

There has been disagreement among scholars as to the acquisition of nationality upon transfer of territory. While some provide for an automatic change of nationality, some declare it as a right, and not a duty, of a State. Nevertheless, in a Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations,\textsuperscript{40} “[e]very individual who, on the date of the succession of States, had the nationality of the predecessor State ... has the right to the nationality of at least one of the States concerned[.]”\textsuperscript{41} It gives due consideration to effective connection and prevention of statelessness by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
\item \textsuperscript{36} See BERNAS, supra note 34, at 182.
\item \textsuperscript{37} BOLESŁAW ADAM BOCKEZ, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 190 (1987).
\item \textsuperscript{38} I LASSA FRANCIS LAWRENCE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 656 (8th ed. 1955).
\item \textsuperscript{39} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Id. art. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{41} See the United Nations: General Assembly, Resolution 55/153 (Jan. 30, 2001).
\end{itemize}
providing that “[e]ach State concerned shall grant a right to opt for its nationality to persons concerned who have appropriate connection with that State if those persons would otherwise become stateless as a result of the succession of States.”  

2. Deprivation and Loss of Nationality

The State also has the absolute freedom of determining the mode upon which an individual would lose their nationality. However, this “[S]tate discretion” with regard to deprivation or withdrawal of nationality is, to a certain extent, “[a] matter [ ] of direct importance for international law.” This is because “[w]hile the former national may suffer hardship by being excluded on the municipal level, withdrawal of nationality by a [S]tate means that the individual in question is, for lack of a better phrase, ‘someone else’s problem’ on the international plane. The individual is left without the consequences of nationality[.]”

Boll also provided for the State practices or modes of withdrawal of nationality, to wit:

(1) Release or renunciation;
(2) Deprivation; and
(3) Expiration.

3. Recognition of Nationality

It is a generally accepted principle of law that municipal law dictates the acquisition or loss of nationality. International law lays down the consequences of such acquisition and loss, and the recognition by other States or “whether a bestowal or removal of nationality must be [recognized] by
other States.” Accordingly, the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930 Hague Convention), declared that “[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be [recognized] by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international customs, and the principles of law generally [recognized] with regard to nationality.”

In this regard, States are not obliged to recognize the nationality of a person if such nationality was not attributed in accordance with international law. As provided in the Nottebohm Case, international law does not afford recognition to a person’s nationality without an effective link with the subject State. Other grounds for non-recognition include:

1. Naturalization of nationals of other States who are unconnected to either the territory or the nationals of a State;
2. Naturalization of all persons of a given religious faith or political persuasion, speaking a given language, or being of a given race;
3. Naturalization by acquisition of real estate; and
4. Inhabitants of mandated and trust territories and of occupied territories.

D. Consequences of Nationality

The importance of State practices in the acquisition and loss of citizenship stems from the acknowledgment that nationality has a variety of effects in international law. Both municipal and international laws confer certain rights, privileges, and duties upon States and its nationals.

50. Id.
52. Id. art. 1.
53. BOLL, supra note 2, at 109.
54. Id. at 109 (citing ALBRECHT RANDELZHOFER, NATIONALITY 419 (2000)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 113.
The following discussion lays down the “international importance” of international law as listed, by Professor Joseph Gabriel Shearer.59

1. The State’s Right of Diplomatic, Consular, or International Protection, and International Claims60

By virtue of nationality, a person may be given protection by the State in which he or she is a national. This consequence includes “providing help or protection to nationals abroad by diplomatic or consular agents, or invoking a claim for compensation when another [S]tate has treated a national in violation of international law.”61 It must be noted, however, that extending protection to nationals within the sphere of international law is discretionary on the part of the State.62

There are problems, however, with regard to the protection of multiple nationals. In such cases, which among the States may afford protection to a multiple national? The general rule is that both States may protect the person as its national. However, as against the other State in which the multiple national is also a national, it “may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also possesses.”63 This is called the principle of equality.64 Also, according to the principle of effective or dominant nationality, a third State shall recognize the nationality of the State in which a multiple national is “habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he [or she] appears to be in fact most closely connected.”65

59. BOLL, supra note 2, at 113 (citing SHEARER, supra note 46, at 32).
60. BOLL, supra note 2, at 141.
61. Id. at 114 (citing RANDELZHOFER, supra note 54, at 420-21).
62. In this regard, it has been noted that

[t]he right involved is one of customary international law, of the [S]tate of nationality, not of the individual. It is unconditional and is unlimited in time, but while [S]tates may provide a right to diplomatic protection to their nationals in their municipal law, in terms of international law its exercise is at the complete discretion of the [S]tate.

BOLL, supra note 2, at 114. (citing WEIS, supra note 10, at 32-44).
63. 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 51, art. 4.
64. BOLL, supra note 2, at 116.
65. Id. (citing 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 51, art. 5).
2. The State’s Responsibility to Other States for Acts of its Nationals

By virtue of nationality, a State may become responsible for the acts of its nationals; provided, however, that the act is “imputable to the [S]tate itself, not just to its national generally.” Accordingly, there could be no conflict when attributing State responsibility over an act of a multiple national. This is because an act must be directly linked to one of the States for the issue of State responsibility to arise.

3. The State’s Duty to Admit Nationals and to Allow Residence

By virtue of nationality, a State has a duty to grant to its nationals entry to its territory and to permit residence. Accordingly, the State has an obligation not to expel its nationals. Otherwise, the State which expels a national to a “[S]tate unwilling to receive them” contravenes “positive international law in relation to territorial supremacy” of the unwilling State.

4. The State’s Jurisdiction

By virtue of nationality, a State exercises jurisdiction over a person “on a personal basis as opposed to a territorial one[]” As a general rule, especially in criminal cases, jurisdiction is exercised by a State if the subject act is committed within its territory — this is called the territorial principle. Accordingly, the State has jurisdiction over all persons, subjects, and transactions occurring or present within its territory. Through time, however, State practice has generated four other principles of jurisdiction.

First is the nationality principle, which provides for State jurisdiction over its nationals wherever they may be found outside the State’s territory. This principle is based on “the grounds that a national owes allegiance to his country irrespective of wherever he may be and that his [S]tate has

66. BOLL, supra note 2, at 122.
67. Id. (citing SHEARER, supra note 46, at 277-80).
68. BOLL, supra note 2, at 122.
69. Id. at 123.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 125.
74. BOLL, supra note 2, at 125.
75. BOCZEK, supra note 37, at 77.
responsibility for its nationals as well as an interest in them and the right to protect them while they are outside its territorial jurisdiction.”

Second is the *passive personality principle*, or principle of passive nationality, which allows a State to acquire jurisdiction over harm done abroad if its national suffers injury or civil damage. This is considered as an “extension of [a State’s] diplomatic protection” to its nationals.

Third is the *protective or security principle*, which recognizes the State’s exercise of jurisdiction over acts of foreign nationals which, though committed outside its territorial jurisdiction, are against the State’s “security and integrity or its vital economic interests.”

Lastly, the *universality principle* permits any State’s exercise of jurisdiction over heinous crimes without consideration over the territory where the crime was committed or the nationality of the subjects involved. These crimes include genocide, piracy, and war crimes as defined in the 1949 Geneva Convention.

5. The State’s Protection of its Nationals and the Use of Force

By virtue of nationality, a State may extend protection to its nationals by use of force against another State. There is, however, no agreement among scholars if indeed such a right exists. As a general rule, States are prohibited from resorting to threat or use of force against the “territorial integrity” or “political independence” of other States. This is without prejudice to the

76. *Id.*
77. *Boll*, supra note 2, at 130 & *Boczek*, supra note 37, at 79.
78. *Boll*, supra note 2, at 130.
79. *Id.* at 132 (citing Ivan Shearer, Jurisdiction, in *Sam Blay et al., Public International Law — An Australian Perspective* 170–71 (2d ed. 2005)).
80. *Boll*, supra note 2, at 133.
82. *Id.* at 133. This consequence of nationality “does not seem to have been applied in favor of just one individual. Along these lines, use of force to protect an individual or small group of individual nations against a [S]tate whose nationality she, he, or they also possess, would indeed seem to lack a legal foundation.” *Id.* at 136.
83. U.N. Charter, art. 2 (4).
State’s inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This provision, along with “humanitarian intervention,” was used for validating the State’s right to protect its nationals by use of force.\footnote{84. BOLL, supra note 2, at 134.}

Protection of nationals under this principle has been criticized as a “pretext to intervene in the political and economic affairs of other States[.],”\footnote{85. Id. at 133.} and as to its applicability to cases of multiple nationals. For the latter, this principle is “weakened” with regard to multiple nationals because of the principle of equality discussed above.\footnote{86. Id. at 135.} As the second State regards the subject as its national, it may treat him or her according to its policies; hence, the intervention of the first State is considered unjustified.\footnote{87. Id. at 135-36.}

6. The State’s Right to Refuse Extradition\footnote{88. Id. at 136.}

Unless there is a treaty providing for such obligation, the State, as a sovereign, has an inherent right to refuse to extradite its national to the custody of a requesting State.\footnote{89. Id.} This is based on the nationality principle, which gives the State the “first bite” to prosecute its own national.\footnote{90. BOLL, supra note 2, at 136.} However, this consequence of nationality is highly susceptible to abuse, as when the State refuses to extradite to the requesting State its national accused of a serious crime, yet fails to effectively prosecute and punish the latter.\footnote{91. Id. at 137.}

7. The State’s Determination of Enemy Status in Wartime\footnote{92. Id. at 139.}

As a consequence of nationality, States determine a person’s “enemy character,” as opposed to “neutral,” during wartime.\footnote{93. Id.} These classifications, however, are not limited to nationality as it may be based on allegiance, residence, and control, among others.\footnote{94. Id.}
E. Multiple Nationality

The peculiar nature of multiple nationality causes disagreements between legal scholars as to its desirability. Multiple nationality arises due to the presence of more than one mode of acquisition of nationality. As discussed in the previous part of this Article, a person may acquire nationality through *jus sanguinis*, *jus soli*, naturalization, resumption, and transfer of territory, among others. Concurrence of any of the two modes, without a mode of losing nationality, may result to multiple nationality.

From the discussion in this Article on the “Consequences of Nationality,” multiple nationality often causes gray areas in the States’ exercise of jurisdiction over their nationals. State practices during the Middle Ages until the independence of the American States in the 19th century caused the “crystallization” of the issues relating to the “overlap of claims to personal jurisdiction by [S]tates over individuals.” 95 Interestingly, however, multiple nationality was embraced, since States were unwilling to relinquish personal jurisdiction over emigrants. 96 Also, there were States which clung to the maxim *semel civis, semper civis* (once a citizen, always a citizen) by providing that acquisition of another nationality would produce no effect on one’s initial nationality. 97

Nevertheless, the 1930 Hague Convention, which entered into force on 1 July 1937, is the only universal multilateral treaty dealing with multiple nationality. 98 The 1930 Hague Convention, under its Preamble, declared that it was directed towards the “abolition of all cases of both statelessness and double nationality.” 99 Its framers were “convinced that it is in the general interest of the international community to secure that all its members should [recognize] that every person should have a nationality and should have *one nationality only*.” 100 However, it was ratified or acceded to by only 22 States — providing for a blurry picture of State practice. 101

95. *Id.* at 184.
96. BOLL, *supra* note 2, at 184.
97. *Id.* at 191.
98. *Id.* at 194.
100. *Id.* (emphasis supplied).
101. Professor Boll expounded on this point by declaring —

The 1930 Hague Convention has been ratified/acceded to by 22 [S]tates, signed by 27 others, and was denounced by Canada in 1996. All ratifications/accessions took place in 1930s, except for succession
Accordingly, the following discussions will outline the arguments for and against multiple nationality.

1. Rejection of Multiple Nationality

Professor Nissim Bar-Yaacov has expressed his disapproval of multiple nationality by proposing only one mode of acquisition of nationality at birth.\(^{102}\) He adopted the view that “neither *jus soli* nor *jus sanguinis* ... is guaranteed to reflect the actual tie of the individual to the [S]tate whose nationality is attributed[,]”\(^{103}\) rather it must be the nationality of the State in which one’s parents established their *permanent residence*.\(^{104}\) Bar-Yaacov, with other legal scholars,\(^{105}\) provided for three main arguments in rejecting multiple nationality.

First is the *essence of nationality*. Multiple nationality causes “headaches” to States because

>[f]or reasons of administrative order and international peace, a regime of nation-[S]tates needs to know where individuals belong. Belonging means membership or citizenship. The fundamental rule of the international regime is that [S]tates should look after their own, and only their own. To do more is to interfere in the affairs of other [S]tates[.]\(^{106}\)

Second is the *emotional attachment and identity of the multiple national*.\(^{107}\) Multiple nationality causes contradiction or imbalance with how a multiple national identifies himself or herself with two or more States. This argumentation stems from the premise that nationality is more than a legal

\(^{102}\) Id. at 209 (citing NISSIM BAR-YAACOV, DUAL NATIONALITY 271 (1961)).

\(^{103}\) Id.

\(^{104}\) Id. at 210.

\(^{105}\) See BOLL, *infra* note 2, at 211.


\(^{107}\) BOLL, *infra* note 2, at 213.
concept, but a sociological one. This involves the exclusive “identification of the individual with a particular [State] and the continuous exercise on his part of certain rights and obligations.”

Third is the impracticality of simultaneously enjoying legal rights and performing legal obligations. This view mainly considers the incompatibility of a multiple national’s loyalty in one State and in the other. As pronounced by Bar-Yaacov —

[N]ationality is considered to imply not only strictly defined legal obligations, such as the performance of military service, but also the loyalty and devotion of the individual. This being so, it is difficult to imagine how an individual could possess the qualifications required for the possession of the nationality of two different States.

In relation to this, the obligation of military service to two or more States is tantamount to incompatible obligations for a multiple national. This is especially true when both States compulsorily require military service from their nationals.

Finally, the vital concern of the rejectionists is the multiple national’s performance of a governmental function involving public trust. This predicament stems from the question of divided loyalty that a multiple national may possess. Professor Peter H. Schuck sufficiently summarized this position by stating —

Our world is one in which hostilities may take the form not only of formal military campaigns but also of clandestine acts of terrorism or theft of valuable technologies undertaken on behalf of undemocratic regimes that[,] nevertheless[,] can claim the fervent political and religious loyalty to their people. Although legal or illegal aliens can also engage in such conduct, citizens probably have somewhat greater opportunities at the margin to do so ... [. ] The fact that few dual nationals pose any greater danger of disloyalty than those with only one nationality does not preclude the risk

108. Id.
109. Id. (citing BAR–YAACOV, supra note 102, at 257).
110. Id. at 215.
111. Id. (citing BAR–YAACOV, supra note 102, at 263) (emphasis supplied).
112. Id. at 217-20.
113. BOLL, supra note 2, at 220-21.
that the dual citizenship of those few may place them in a better position to wreak immense damage.\(^{114}\)

It must be emphasized, however, that divided loyalty is not a concern in the private sector. This is because companies benefit from multiple nationality by providing its employees with “additional flexibility in terms of travel and access to labor markets.”\(^{115}\)

2. Acceptance of Multiple Nationality

On the other side of the debate, legal scholars are leaning towards “tolerance” of multiple nationality.\(^{116}\) Under this view, multiple nationality is a modern trend that the international community should embrace due to “high levels of immigration, changes in [S]tate policies, and the continuation of both *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* citizenship norms.”\(^{117}\)

Acceptance of multiple nationals is essentially beneficial to States for the naturalization of resident aliens or immigrants and as part of a democratic State or process.\(^{118}\) The argument of conflicting interest in cases of military service has been rendered illusory by the “increasing implausibility” of war or armed conflict.\(^{119}\) Added to this is the fact that compulsory military service has been increasingly abandoned as a State practice.\(^{120}\)

Professor Peter J. Spiro has adopted the view that “republicanism demands inclusion[,]” hence, resident aliens should become citizens and be part of the body politic.\(^{121}\) Accordingly, nationals abroad are also entitled to political participation such as the right to vote. Such is the practice in Mexico, Italy, and the Philippines, among others.\(^{122}\) Further, the argument

\(^{114}\) *Id.* at 221 (citing *PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGER, AND IN-BETWEENS — ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP* 239 (1998)).

\(^{115}\) *Id.* at 221.

\(^{116}\) *Id.* at 223.

\(^{117}\) *Id.* (citing *ALEINIKOFF & KLUSMEYER, supra* note 106, at 86–87).


\(^{119}\) *BOLL, supra* note 2, at 224.

\(^{120}\) *Id.* at 218.

\(^{121}\) *Id.* at 228 (citing Spiro, *Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, supra* note 118, at 1466–68).

\(^{122}\) *PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION* 71 (2008).
that political participation of multiple nationals may lead to interference of other States is “unlikely” according to Spiro, because “any inclination to vote according to the interest of a foreign [S]tate, or under pressure from a foreign [S]tate, can take place without any foreign nationality.”

This Article does not aim to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of multiple nationality. Such conclusion is dominantly a policy issue and beyond the concern of this Article. Nevertheless, from the above discussion, it can be seen that citizenship and nationality, in international law, are different and complex, albeit often interchangeable, concepts. To reiterate, as far as international law is concerned, nationality is the legal status conferred upon a person by a State under international law, while citizenship is a person’s relationship with the State under municipal law. Through different State practices, the international legal regime has developed different modes of acquiring and withdrawing nationality. However, through the Nottebohm Case, citizenship under municipal legislation does not automatically translate to nationality under international law.

After laying down the pertinent State practices in citizenship and nationality, its relevance in international law, and the concept of multiple nationality, the Authors will now discuss the crux of this Article — citizenship under Philippine constitutional law.

III. PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND THE CASE OF POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

It is not for [i]nternational [l]aw but for [m]unicipal [l]aw to determine who is, and who is not, to be considered a subject.

— Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim

Citizenship is a person’s relationship with the State under its municipal law and, as such, largely depends on municipal legislation. In the Philippines, Filipino citizens are enumerated under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to wit:

(1) [t]hose who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of [the] Constitution;

(2) [t]hose whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

123. Id. at 229 (citing Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, supra note 118, at 1469–72).

124. I OPPENHEIM, supra note 38, at 643.
(3) [t]hose born before [17 January] 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) [t]hose who are naturalized in accordance with law.\textsuperscript{125}

Hence, the 1987 Constitution follows the rule of \textit{jus sanguinis} and also provides for naturalization.\textsuperscript{126} Accordingly, for one to be a Filipino citizen, he or she must demonstrate either blood relationship with a Filipino citizen, or an act of naturalization; otherwise, a person cannot be considered as a Filipino citizen, let alone a natural-born Filipino.

This finds relevance in cases where no less than the Constitution requires “natural-born citizenship” in order to qualify for public service. Such requirement is indispensable to qualify to run for the positions of Senator,\textsuperscript{127} Member of the House of Representatives,\textsuperscript{128} Vice-President,\textsuperscript{129} Justice of the Supreme Court,\textsuperscript{130} Chairman and Commissioner of the Constitutional Commissions, Ombudsman and its Deputies,\textsuperscript{131} Chairman and Member of the Commission on Human Rights, and most importantly, the President.\textsuperscript{132}

Therefore, for one to qualify for these offices, he or she must be a “citizen[ ] of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.”\textsuperscript{133} These provisions were put into scrutiny when a “foundling” in the name of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares filed her certificate of candidacy for President.\textsuperscript{134}

The Court, however, in the case of \textit{Poe-Llamanzares}, declared that there was no misrepresentation on the part of Poe when she declared in her certificate of candidacy that she is a natural-born citizen — despite being a

\textsuperscript{125}PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
\textsuperscript{126}BERNAS, \textit{supra} note 38, at 182.
\textsuperscript{127}PHIL. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
\textsuperscript{128}PHIL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
\textsuperscript{129}PHIL. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
\textsuperscript{130}PHIL. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (1).
\textsuperscript{131}PHIL. CONST. art. XI, § 8.
\textsuperscript{132}PHIL. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
\textsuperscript{133}PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
foundling — and has resided in the Philippines for a period of 10 years immediately preceding the day of the elections.

Arising now is the question of whether the Court has finally ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, or if the ruling was a pro hac vice one.

To better understand this landmark case in constitutional law, its facts are briefly laid down, followed by the relevant issues and rulings of the Court’s majority. The Authors then provide for an elaborate discussion on the two contentious main points laid down by the majority: first, its reliance on statistics and probabilities in concluding that it is “highly probable” that Poe is born of Filipino parents; and second, its reliance on international documents, including those not signed by the Philippines, in obligating the State to grant citizenship to foundlings.

A. Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case

1. From “Foundling” to a Presidential Candidate

On 3 September 1968, Poe was found abandoned by Edgardo Militar in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Emiliano registered Poe with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City and was issued with a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth. When Poe was five years old, she was legally adopted by celebrity couple Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesus Sonora Poe (Susan Roces).

For her college education, Poe initially enrolled in the University of the Philippines, Manila to pursue a degree in Development Studies. However, in 1988, she decided to continue her college education at Boston College in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, US. She graduated from there in 1991 and, in the same year, married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares in San Juan City, Philippines. The couple flew back to the US where Poe gave birth to their eldest son, Brian Daniel.

135. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 114.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 115.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 115.
On 18 October 2001, Poe became a naturalized American citizen and obtained a US Passport in December of that same year.\textsuperscript{142}

On 8 April 2004, Poe went back to the Philippines to support the candidacy of her adoptive father Fernando Poe, Jr. who was running for President in the May 2004 elections.\textsuperscript{143} She returned to the US in July of the same year, but just a few months later, went back to the Philippines upon learning of her father’s deteriorating health condition.\textsuperscript{144} The latter died and Poe stayed in the Philippines until 3 February 2005 to assist in the settlement of her father’s estate.\textsuperscript{145}

Because of the death of her father, Poe and her family decided to move to the Philippines in 2005. Poe and her husband made the necessary changes with regard to the schooling of their children, moving their household goods and furniture, and bringing their pet dog, among others.\textsuperscript{146}

On 24 May 2005, Poe and her children returned to the Philippines.\textsuperscript{147} In the second half of 2005, her husband purchased a condominium unit in One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City.\textsuperscript{148} In early 2006, the Llamanzares spouses acquired a house and lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City which they constituted as their family home, and where they reside in even today.\textsuperscript{149}

On 7 July 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.\textsuperscript{150} On 10 July 2006, she also filed a petition with the Bureau of Immigration to reacquire Philippine

\textsuperscript{142}. Id.
\textsuperscript{143}. Id.
\textsuperscript{144}. Id. at 116.
\textsuperscript{145}. Id.
\textsuperscript{146}. Id.
\textsuperscript{147}. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 116.
\textsuperscript{148}. Id. at 117.
\textsuperscript{149}. Id.
\textsuperscript{150}. Id. & An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended and for Other Purposes [Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003], Republic Act No. 9225 (2003).
citizenship, together with the petition for derivative citizenship of her children. These were all granted by the Bureau.

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. C. Aquino, III appointed Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board. Before assuming her post, she executed, by virtue of R.A. No. 9225, an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship.”

On 9 December 2011, the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila issued a “Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States” after Poe executed an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of United States” in the US Embassy.

On 2 October 2012, Poe filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator in the 2013 elections. For the question of “[p]eriod of residence in the Philippines before [13 May] 2013,” she answered “six years and six months” or from November 2006. Poe won the senatorial race with the highest number of votes.

On 15 October 2015, Poe again filed her COC this time for the highest Executive position — the Presidency. She declared therein that she was a resident of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months (counted from 24 May 2005) from the date of the elections on 9 May 2016.

2. Petitions before the Commission on Elections

Poe’s filing of the COC for President triggered four petitions asking the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to cancel her COC. These petitions were filed by Estrella Elamparo, Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez (collectively, petitioners). The main argument of the four petitions was the alleged misrepresentation committed by Poe in her

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151. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 117.
152. Id. at 118.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 119.
156. Id.
157. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 119.
158. Id.
159. Id.
COC. First, when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-born citizen despite being a “foundling;” and second, when she declared that she was a resident of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months before the day of the election.

The petitioners argued that, being a foundling, Poe has no known blood relationship, hence, it cannot be concluded that she is a Filipino citizen under the *jus sanguinis* rule. Also, international conventions and treaties do not confer Filipino citizenship, let alone natural-born status, to foundlings. There is also no standard State practice that automatically grants such status to foundlings like Poe. Accordingly, R.A. No. 9225, relating to the re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship, does not apply to her since she is not a natural-born citizen to begin with. Assuming that she is a natural-born citizen, Poe had lost this status upon naturalization as an American citizen.

With regard to Poe’s 10-year residency, all four petitioners were in agreement that she had failed to meet the requirement, but differed in the reckoning period of her residency. They provided that her period of residency should begin from the day when Poe took an Oath of Allegiance under R.A. No. 9225, the day she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration in July 2006, or the day she renounced her American citizenship in 2011. Petitioners also agreed that regardless of the reckoning period, Poe made an admission in her 2013 COC that she was a resident of the Philippines for only six years and six months.

By virtue of these petitions, the COMELEC First and Second Divisions ruled against Poe by cancelling her COC because it contained material misrepresentations and, accordingly, she was not qualified to run for the Presidency. The rulings of the two COMELEC Divisions were affirmed by the COMELEC *en banc*, which denied Poe’s Motions for Reconsideration.
From the denial of her Motions for Reconsideration, Poe filed two petitions for *certiorari* with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court.\(^\text{168}\)

**B. Issues and Rulings of the Majority**

Poe was victorious. The Court, in a decision dated 8 March 2016, ruled in favor of her natural-born citizenship and her 10-year residency. The following discussion provides for the issues and the respective rulings of the Supreme Court.

1. COMELEC’s Power to Decide on the Qualifications, or Lack thereof, of a Candidate

The Court ruled in the negative and deprived the COMELEC of jurisdiction to rule on Poe’s disqualification case. Relying on its pronouncements in *Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections*\(^\text{169}\) and *Fermin v. Commission on Elections*,\(^\text{170}\) along with the amendment of the COMELEC’s Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled that disqualification of a Presidential candidate must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court.\(^\text{171}\) Accordingly, the Constitution particularly provided for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (i.e., the Supreme Court *en banc*) as the “sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President[.]”\(^\text{172}\)

2. Poe’s Blood Relationship and Status as a Natural-Born Citizen

The Court interestingly ruled, using statistics and probabilities, that Poe is born of a Filipino mother and father, and hence, is a natural-born Filipino. Citing data from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA), the Court concluded that there is 99.55-99.62% probability that Poe has Filipino blood relationship.\(^\text{173}\)

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\(^\text{171}\) Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 134.

\(^\text{172}\) PHIL. CONST. art. VII, § 4.

\(^\text{173}\) Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 136. The Court’s use of probabilities and statistics is elaborated in the latter part of this Article.
Further, the Court ruled that foundlings are natural-born citizens when analyzed through the lenses of municipal and international law. Under municipal law, the Court gave sufficient weight to the intention of the 1934 Constitutional Convention to include foundlings in the enumeration of Filipino citizens. The amendment suggested by Mr. Nicolas M. Rafols, Jr. was set aside merely because the number of foundlings was not enough to warrant a specific mention in the 1935 Constitution. Also, the 1987 Constitution guarantees the basic right to equal protection of laws, to dignity of every person, and “to assistance, ... and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, [and] exploitation” of children. Under international law, the Court cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as obligating the Philippines to grant foundlings Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court also relied on the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, despite the Philippines not being a signatory to these two international instruments.

The argumentation of the Court on this issue is further discussed by the Authors in the subsequent part of this Article.

174. Id. at 139-41.
175. Id. at 141.
176. PHIL. CONST. art. III, § 1.
177. PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 11.
178. PHIL. CONST. art. XV, § 3.
179. UDHR, supra note 30.
182. 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 51.
184. See Parts II (C) and II (D) of this Article.
3. Poe’s Status as a Resident of the Philippines for 10 years on the Day Before the 2016 Elections

The Supreme Court also ruled that Poe satisfied the constitutional requirement of 10-year residency. It reckoned the period from 24 May 2005 when the family permanently returned to the Philippines. The Court called out the COMELEC in treating Poe’s period of residency in her 2012 COC as conclusive against her. Such mistake, according to the Court, may be overcome by the overwhelming evidence presented that Poe was in the Philippines since 24 May 2005. Accordingly, “[h]ad the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.”

4. Poe’s Commission of False Misrepresentation in her Certificate of Candidacy

Finally, by ruling that Poe is a natural-born citizen and a resident of the Philippines for a period of 10 years, the Court concluded that she did not commit any misrepresentation in her COC and that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Poe’s COC.

C. The Majority Decision: Novel Tools of Judicial Review and Liberal Interpretation of International Law

A plain reading of the majority decision shows the interconnectedness of the arguments laid down by the Court. But, among these arguments, the majority adopted novel and arguable approaches in resolving the issues presented before it. First, it relied on statistics in concluding that it is “highly probable” that Poe is born of Filipino parents; and second, it relied on international documents, including those not signed by the Philippines, in obligating the State to grant citizenship to foundlings.

1. “High Probability” Citizenship of Foundlings

Interestingly, the majority of the Justices adopted the official statistics from the PSA presented by the Office of the Solicitor General. The statistics admitted by the Court, as summarized in Table 1, show the “high

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185. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 157.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 161.
probability” that Poe is born of Filipino parents because more than 99% of the population in Iloilo in 1960 and 1970 were Filipinos.¹⁸⁸


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Foreigner</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>962,532</td>
<td>4,734</td>
<td>99.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>210,349</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>99.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>230,528</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>99.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,162,669</td>
<td>5,304</td>
<td>99.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>245,740</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>99.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>270,299</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>99.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worthy to note that in the ¹¹¹th footnote in the Poe-Llamanzares case, the Court cited the cases of Herrera v. Commission on Elections¹⁸⁹ and Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections¹⁹⁰ in declaring that statistics from the PSA and its predecessor agencies are admissible as evidence.¹⁹¹ However, Herrera and Bagabuyo involved the districting of Guimaras and Cagayan de Oro City, respectively, using census statistics from the National Statistics Office (the predecessor-office of the PSA). They did not involve an issue of citizenship.

Arguably, the use of statistics and probabilities is not new to the Court. In torts cases, the Court has consistently used probabilities in the computation of an aggrieved party’s life expectancy; in evidence cases, it adopts certain discussions on probabilities to determine conclusiveness of non-paternity in DNA cases.¹⁹² As such, one could ask if there is indeed a sufficient legal basis for the Court’s use of probabilities in ruling that one is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

The Court further stretched its argumentation by resorting to other circumstantial evidence, including “the fact that [Poe] was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino

¹⁸⁸. Id. at 136.
¹⁹¹. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA, at 111.
features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes[,] and an oval face.”

With the conclusion that probabilities laid down are admissible under Section 4, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, the Court declared that there is “more than ample probability[,] if not statistical certainty, that [Poe’s] parents are Filipinos.”

2. Right of Foundlings to Nationality Under International Law

After providing for a discussion of a “high probability” of citizenship, the majority pronounced the legal status of a foundling under both municipal and international law. It was concluded that foundlings are citizens under international law, through an examination of international treaties which the Philippines has signed, as well as those to which the Philippines has not.

International law becomes part of Philippine laws either by incorporation or transformation. On the one hand, the method of incorporation is embodied in Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution by providing that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.” In Mijares v. Ranada, the Court declared that international customary rules are generally accepted principles of international law. On the other hand, the method of transformation requires that international law be “transformed” into municipal law through local legislation for it to be part of Philippine laws. This is embodied in Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution which states that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.”

In categorically ruling that foundlings are citizens under international law, the majority of the Court used as basis the following international

193. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 137 (emphases supplied).
195. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 137.
196. Id. at 144.
197. PHIL. CONST. art. II, § 2.
199. Id.
201. PHIL. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
treaties: (1) the UDHR; (2) the UNCRC; (3) the ICCPR; (4) the 1930 Hague Convention; and (5) the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

In the case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court interpreted the UDHR as part of the generally accepted principles of international law, hence binding on the Philippines. Under Article 15 of the same, “[e]veryone has the right to a nationality.”

Further, Article 7 of the UNCRC, ratified by the Philippines on 21 August 1990, imposes upon the State the following obligations:

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents; and

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

Also ratified by the Philippines on 23 October 1986, Article 24 (3) of the ICCPR provides that “[e]very child has the right to acquire a nationality.”

From the foregoing international documents, the Court adopted the view that the Philippines obligated itself “to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.” It also liberally construed the international obligation by imposing upon the Philippines the duty to adhere to the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction

202. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 144-49.
203. UDHR, supra note 30.
204. UNCRC, supra note 180.
205. ICCPR, supra note 181.
206. 1930 Hague Convention, supra note 51.
209. Id.
210. UDHR, supra note 30, art. 15 (emphases supplied).
211. UNCRC, supra note 180, art. 7.
212. UNCRC, supra note 180, art. 7 (emphases supplied).
213. ICCPR, supra note 181, art. 24 (3) (emphases supplied).
214. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 146.
of Statelessness, despite not being a contracting State to either of these.\textsuperscript{215} The Court reiterated its ruling in \textit{Razon v. Tagitis}\textsuperscript{216} and \textit{Mijares} where it relied on unratified treaties as generally accepted principles of international law and as widespread State practice.

The Supreme Court rationalized this by saying that Section 15 of the UDHR merely “affirms” Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention —

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the \textit{nationality of the country of birth}. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proven, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.\textsuperscript{217}

Also, Article 2 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness “gives effect” to Article 15 (1) of the UDHR by providing that a “foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be \textit{considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State}.”\textsuperscript{218}

In view of the foregoing arguments, the majority of the Supreme Court ruled that the Philippines has an obligation under international law to grant natural-born citizen status to foundlings like Poe. Hence, Poe was “declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.”\textsuperscript{219}

\textbf{D. The Dissenting Opinions: Classic Statutory Construction of International Law}

The \textit{Poe-Llamanzares} case is not a product of unanimity among the Justices of the Court. It is a divided decision with six Justices dissenting from the decision of the majority. As such, the Authors will discuss the arguments of the dissenting Justices, in light of the “novel and arguable” propositions of the majority.

\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Id.} at 147-48.
\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Razon v. Tagitis}, 606 SCRA 598 (2009).
\textsuperscript{217} 1930 Hague Convention, \textit{supra} note 51, art. 14 (emphases supplied).
\textsuperscript{218} Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, \textit{supra} note 183, art. 2 (emphases supplied).
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Poe-Llamanzares}, 786 SCRA at 162.
1. “High Probability” Citizenship has No Basis in Law

The use of statistics and probability has no basis in the Constitution or in law. Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provided for an exclusive enumeration of Filipino citizens and for the definition of a natural-born citizen. From a plain reading of the provision, it does not provide for the use of statistical probability in determining one’s citizenship.

Further, it must be noted that the statistics presented by the Solicitor General are numbers of Filipino and foreign males and females in the Philippines and in Iloilo. As observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio — “[t]he data do not show the number of foundlings born in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 and from 2010 to 2014. The data also do not show the number of foundlings who were later determined to have Filipino parentage.” Accordingly, what the data provides is the number of Filipino and foreign births, and not of foundlings since, in the first place, there is no way to know the parentage of a foundling. It is nothing but fallacious to utilize the class of children with known parents in determining the probability of a foundling’s citizenship. This is plain non sequitur and was described by Justice Carpio as “comparing apples with oranges and avocados.”

By concluding that it is highly probable that a foundling abandoned in the Philippines is highly probable to be a Filipino citizen because he or she is found in the Philippines, the Court is virtually substituting the jus sanguinis rule with the jus soli rule.

2. The Philippines has No Obligation Under International Law to Grant Citizenship to Foundlings

The determination of who are a State’s citizens is solely within the domain of municipal law. Though international law may, in some instances, give an effect of nationality as ruled in the Nottebohm Case, still, “every independent nation [has an inherent right] to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its

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220. PHIL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 & 2.
221. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 377 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 378.
citizenship.” Justice Carpio summarized this view from the perspective of municipal law in this wise —

This means that municipal law, both constitutional and statutory, determines and regulates the conditions on which citizenship is acquired. There is no such thing as international citizenship or international law by which citizenship may be acquired. Whether an individual possesses the citizenship of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the constitution and statutory laws of that State.

According to the dissenting Justices, by the plain and unequivocal wording of the 1935 Constitution, and the subsequent Constitutions, foundlings are not Filipino citizens, let alone natural-born. Compared to the liberal interpretation made by the majority, the dissenting Justices relied on basic statutory construction in debunking the arguments laid down by the majority. A two-tier argument was made — the first is based on municipal law, and the second on international law.

The 1935 Constitution does not expressly provide for foundlings as Filipino citizens. Verba legis non est recedendum — from the words of the statute there should be no departure. Assuming there is an ambiguity in the constitutional provision, ratio legis est anima — the words of the Constitution should be interpreted based on the intent of the framers. According to Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, Poe cannot take refuge in the records of the 1934 Constitutional Convention because the Convention rejected the inclusion of foundlings in the 1935 Constitution.

Also, the list of Filipino citizens under Article IV of the 1935 Constitution is an exclusive list. Being so, expressio unius est exclusio alterius — items not provided in a list are presumed not to be included in it. As foundlings are clearly not included in Article IV, Section 1, they are not granted citizenship under the 1935 Constitution — unless they choose to avail of the opportunity to be naturalized under Section 1 (5).

227. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 354 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion) (emphases supplied).
228. 1935 PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (superseded 1973).
229. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 567 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion).
230. Id. at 568 (citing Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), 682 SCRA 602, 649 (2012)).
231. 1935 PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (superseded 1973).
Accordingly, the 1935 Constitution must be interpreted as a whole, *ut magis valeat quam pereat*.\textsuperscript{233} Justice Brion explained —

To address the position that [ ] Poe related in this case, the fact that the 1935 Constitution did not provide for a situation where both parents are unknown (as also the case in the current 1987 Constitution) does not mean that the provision on citizenship is ambiguous with respect to foundlings; it simply means that the constitutional provision on citizenship based on blood or parentage has not been made available under the Constitution but the provision must be read in its totality so that we must look to other applicable provisions that are available, which in this case is paragraph (5) as explained above.

In negative terms, even if Poe’s suggested interpretation *via* the parentage provision did not expressly apply and thus left a gap, the omission does not mean that we can take liberties with the Constitution through stretched interpretation, and forcibly read the situation so as to place foundlings within the terms of the Constitution’s parentage provisions. We cannot and should not do this as we would thereby cross the forbidden path of judicial legislation.\textsuperscript{234}

Further, under international law, the Philippines has no obligation to grant an automatic citizenship to foundlings. As far as the Philippines is concerned, international obligations cannot contravene the Constitution.

Clearly, the ICCPR and the UNCRC are both valid and binding on the Philippines. However, from the clear wording of these treaties, they merely provide for the “right of every child to acquire nationality.”\textsuperscript{235} They merely impose an obligation on the part of the State Parties to “recognize and facilitate the child’s right to acquire a nationality[.]”\textsuperscript{236} and not to

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\textsuperscript{233} Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 566 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion) (citing Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalaskit na Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. 460 Phil. 830 (2003) & Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council 691 Phil. 173 (2012)).

\textsuperscript{234} Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 569-70 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion) (emphasis supplied).

\textsuperscript{235} ICCPR, supra note 181, art. 24 (3) & UNCRC, supra note 180, art. 7 (1) (emphasis supplied).

\textsuperscript{236} Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 583 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion) (emphasis omitted). Justice Carpio expounded on the matter by saying — “The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child [(UNCRC)] does not guarantee a child a nationality at birth, much less a natural-born citizenship at birth as understood under the Philippine Constitution, but merely the right to acquire a nationality in accordance with municipal law.” Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 358 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion) (emphasis supplied).
\end{flushleft}
immediately and automatically confer Philippine citizenship to foundlings. In fact, Article 2 (2) of the ICCPR\(^{237}\) and Article 4 of the UNCRC\(^{238}\) provide that obligations under the treaties must be complied with through a “framework of [a] State’s national laws.”\(^{239}\)

Justice Carpio also pointed out that the UNCRC was ratified on 21 August 1990, or more than 20 years after the birth of Poe in 1968.\(^{240}\) Accordingly, the UNCRC which defined a “child” as a human being below 18 years old\(^{241}\) could not have affected the status of Poe.\(^{242}\)

Further, Justice Brion emphasized that the UDHR is not a treaty.\(^{243}\) He explained —

> It is an international document recognizing inalienable human rights, which eventually led to the creation of severally legally-binding human rights, such as the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Thus, the Philippines is not legally-obligated to comply with the provisions of the UDHR per se. It signed the UDHR because it recognizes the

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\(^{237}\) Article 2 (2) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights provides the following —

> Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.

ICCPR, supra note 181, art. 2 (2) (emphasis supplied).

\(^{238}\) Article 4 of the UNCRC declares —

> States Parties shall undertake all appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. With regard to economic, social[,] and cultural rights, States Parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation.

UNCRC, supra note 180, art. 4 (emphasis supplied).

\(^{239}\) Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 583 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion).

\(^{240}\) Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 358 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion).

\(^{241}\) UNCRC, supra note 180, art. 1.

\(^{242}\) Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 357–58 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion).

\(^{243}\) Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 585 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion).
rights and values enumerated in the UDHR; this recognition led it to sign both the ICCPR and the ICESCR.\textsuperscript{244}

Assuming, however, that the UDHR has reached the status of a customary international law (CIL) or of a generally-accepted principle of law, Article 15 does not require an automatic grant of citizenship to foundlings. It merely recognizes the right of every person to nationality, but it does not impose any obligation on the signatory States on the manner of recognition.\textsuperscript{245}

Moreover, with regard to the supposed obligation of the Philippines under the 1930 Hague Convention, Justice Carpio categorically declared that the Philippines is not bound by the treaty, not being a signatory to it.\textsuperscript{246} But assuming that the 1930 Hague Convention has also reached the level of a generally-accepted principle of international law, the Convention clearly provides foundlings with a “nationality of the\textit{ country of birth[,] }” and not\textit{ nationality at birth }of the State where the foundling was abandoned.\textsuperscript{247} Article 14 only provides for a presumption — not an obligation — that a foundling is a citizen of the State in which it is found. The majority also seem to have forgotten Article 15 of the Convention which provides that

[w]here the nationality of a State is not acquired automatically by reason of birth on its territory, a child born on the territory of that State of parents having no nationality, or of unknown nationality, \textit{may} obtain the nationality of the said State. \textit{The law of that State shall determine the conditions governing the acquisition of its nationality in such cases.}\textsuperscript{248}

Accordingly, no less than the 1930 Hague Convention itself provides that the acquisition of nationality, or citizenship for that matter, is not automatic and requires an implementation through domestic legislation.

Also, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not bind the Philippines, which is a non-contracting State. Article 2 provides that “[a] foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within that

\textsuperscript{244}Id. (emphasis supplied).
\textsuperscript{245}Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 359 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion) & Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 586 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion).
\textsuperscript{246}Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 360 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion).
\textsuperscript{247}Id. (emphasis omitted).
\textsuperscript{248}1930 Hague Convention, supra note 51, art. 15 (emphasis supplied).
territoire of parents possessing the nationality of that State[,]” 249 Justice
Carpio had the following legal conclusions:

(1) Article 2 applies only to foundlings found in Contracting States;
but Poe was found in the Philippines which is not a Contracting
State. 250

(2) Assuming that the Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness binds the Philippines, Article 2 applies only in the
absence of proof that the parents of the foundling are not
citizens of another State. This is a factual issue that requires
administrative or judicial determination, hence, the grant of
citizenship cannot be automatic; 251 and

(3) Article 2 requires municipal statutory law. The grant of
citizenship contemplated by the Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness is by operation of law or through naturalization
as provided under Philippine laws. 252

Stretching the argumentation further, is granting foundlings natural-born
citizenship CIL? Or is the presumption under the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness that a foundling is “born within [the] territory of
parents possessing the nationality of that State” CIL?

In the case of Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 253 CIL was defined as the “general
and consistent practice of states recognized and followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.” 254 It requires two elements: (1) State practice or
the “continuous repetition of the same or similar kind of acts or norms by
States;” 255 and (2) opinio juris sive necessitates which requires that the State
practice “be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this

249. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 183, art. 2.
250. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 362 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion).
251. Id.
252. Id.
254. Id. at 293 (citing Patrick Simon S. Perillo, Transporting the Concept of Creeping
Expropriation from De Lege Ferenda to De Lege Lata: Concretizing the Nebulous
Under International Law, 53 ATENEO L.J. 434, 509–10 (2008)).
255. Bayan Muna, 641 SCRA at 293.
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”

Justice Carpio ruled in the negative. Particularly, he pointed out that the element of State practice is absent because only 64 States have ratified the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, out of the 193 Member-States of the United Nations. Of these 64 States, only 13 States provide for an “automatic and unconditional acquisition of nationality by foundlings.”

Assuming _arguendo_ that the Philippines should grant citizenship to foundlings, such grant does not necessarily translate to a natural-born status. As discussed, the Philippines confers citizenship either by the _jus sanguinis_ rule or by naturalization. Article IV, Section 2 defines a natural-born citizen as a “citizen[ ] of the Philippines from birth _without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship[,]” which excludes naturalization and necessarily implies _jus sanguinis_ or blood relationship. Having no known blood relation to a Filipino father or mother, a foundling cannot be a natural-born citizen but only a citizen by naturalization.

From the foregoing discussions, the Philippines has no international obligation to grant citizenship to foundlings like Poe. As the majority of the Court resorted to probabilities and liberal interpretation, the dissenting Justices reached this conclusion through classic statutory construction.

**IV. THE GAP IN THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: ANSWERS AND CONSEQUENCES**

*Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority.*

— Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

The Philippines is undoubtedly a part of a community of nations. However, it is clear that the issue of citizenship is within the exclusive realm of

256. _Id._ (citing North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Neth. & Ger./Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 1, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20)).

257. _Poe-Llamanzares_, 786 SCRA at 365 (J. Carpio, dissenting opinion).

258. _Id._ at 367.

259. PHIL. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (emphasis supplied).

municipal law. The State adopts a dualist approach to international law, by virtue of which the Philippines may look at the issue of citizenship from two lenses — the international plane and the domestic plane. Accordingly, Justice Brion explained —

The rule in the domestic plane is, of course, separate and different from our rule in the international plane where treaty obligations prevail. If the country fails to comply with its treaty obligations because they contradict our national laws, there could be repercussions in our dealings with other States. This consequence springs from the rule that our domestic laws cannot be used to evade compliance with treaties in the international plane. Repercussions in the international plane, however, do not make an unconstitutional treaty constitutional and valid. These repercussions also cannot serve as an excuse to enforce a treaty provision that is constitutionally void in the domestic plane.

As such, as far as the Philippines is concerned, the question of natural-born citizenship is governed by the 1987 Constitution. It is clear that there is a constitutional void when a foundling runs for the highest Executive position in the land. The Constitution provides for an exclusive list of Filipino citizens without including foundlings. Did it leave the determination to the Legislature or to the Judiciary? In any case, such determination should not contravene its express provisions. The Legislature cannot add foundlings to the exclusive enumeration of the 1987 Constitution, and the Judiciary cannot interpret it in a matter contrary to the real intention of the Constitution.

If the obligation is primarily legislative, may the Supreme Court, in Poe-Llamanzares, be considered to have crossed the border of judicial legislation? In the case of Constantino, Jr. v. Cuisia, the Court itself declared that the “worst kind of judicial legislation [is when] the courts ... misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act.” It is also too stretched of an interpretation for the Supreme Court to utilize census and probabilities in rationalizing Poe’s natural-born citizenship. This is considered a novel tool in the judicial review of constitutional cases. Census has been consistently used by the Supreme Court in districting, as in the cited cases of Herrera and Bagabuyo. However, the Authors are unaware of any case applying the same method in citizenship issues, apart from Poe-Llamanzares.

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261. Poe-Llamanzares, 786 SCRA at 580-81 (J. Brion, dissenting opinion).
262. Id. at 587-88.
264. Id. at 525.
The Court must not lose sight of the fact that the determination of natural-born status has a wide array of consequences — from political status to economic, cultural, and social rights. The 1987 Constitution reserves the highest government positions to natural-born citizens. Being a natural-born citizen is indispensable to qualify for the positions of Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, Vice-President, Justice of the Supreme Court, Chairman or Commissioner of the Constitutional Commissions, Ombudsman or its Deputies, and most importantly, the chief executive — the President. Also, a natural-born citizen who has lost his citizenship may still be a transferee of private lands, despite the constitutional limitation against foreign ownership of lands, and subject to limitations provided by law. Only natural-born citizens are qualified to be members of the Monetary Board, the central monetary authority of the Philippines.

265. PHIL. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
266. PHIL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
267. PHIL. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
268. PHIL. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (1).
269. PHIL. CONST. art. XI, § 8.
270. PHIL. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
271. PHIL. CONST. art. XII, § 8. See also PHIL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2 & 7. The limitation refers to Section 10 of the Foreign Investments Act, amended, to wit

Section 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the provisions of Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution. — Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under the Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 5,000 square meters in the case of urban land or three hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes. In the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, that if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for business or other purposes which when added to those already owned by him shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.

A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two lots which should be situated in different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines; Provided, That the total land area thereof shall not
The Court’s declaration as to the natural-born citizenship of foundlings may be interpreted as a pro hac vice decision applying only to the very peculiar circumstances of the case of Poe. It may also be considered as a mere obiter dictum as the Court was called upon to rule primarily on the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to decide on the qualifications of the candidates for President.

Indeed, this case is of a peculiar nature. It is worth emphasizing that Poe has been a consistent frontrunner in the 2016 Presidential elections. As such, one must not lose sight of the Supreme Court’s possible intention to give effect to the will of the electorate. In fact, it has been a consistent stance of the Supreme Court, in deciding constitutional and electoral cases, to give deference to the choice of the Filipino people. As early as the 1926 case of Mandac v. Samonte, the Supreme Court made a proposition that the Judiciary should not rule in a manner that will frustrate the true expression of the will of the electorate. In Maruhom v. Commission on Elections, regarding elections contests, the Supreme Court declared that “laws and

exceed [ ] 5,000 square meters in the case of urban land or three [ ] hectares in the case of rural land for use by him for business or other purposes. A transferee who has already acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring rural land and vice versa.


275. Id. at 299.


277. “Election contests” refer to election protests or petitions for quo warranto. On one hand, “election protest” is an “election contest relating to the election and returns of elective officials, grounded on frauds or irregularities in the conduct of the elections, the casting and counting of the ballots and the preparation and canvassing of returns. The issue is who obtained the plurality of valid votes cast[;]” on the other hand, a quo warranto is an “election contest relating to the qualifications of an elective official on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. The issue is whether respondent possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law.” Commission on Elections, Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the
statutes governing election contests, especially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that *the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated* by technical infirmities.”

The will of the electorate, however, must be balanced with the express constitutional provisions outlining the qualifications of the President and the definition of a natural-born citizen. At the end of the day, the Philippine government is a government of law, and not of men.

V. EPILOGUE

This brief survey of the varying opinions of the majority and the minority in the Supreme Court in *Poe-Llamanzares* has squarely outlined two approaches to judicial interpretation of existing international law instruments in relation to municipal law.

The resolution by the majority opinion demonstrates a continuing tension between international law and municipal law. What is clear from the entire deliberation of the Court is that State practice in the determination of citizenship remains with the State. The application of this power, however, is susceptible of resorting to creative tools of statutory construction. On the one hand, the majority of the Court emphasized a human rights perspective. On the other hand, the weighty dissenting opinion stressed a strict construction in an effort to avoid the tendency towards judicial legislation.

In the end, the Supreme Court has once again engaged in an exercise that puts into context a highly charged electoral debate — the outcome of which may not necessarily determine the actual results of the 2016 elections.

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278. *Maruhom*, 331 SCRA at 485-86 (emphasis supplied).